Specifying attentional top-down influences on subsequent unconscious
					semantic processing by Martens, Ulla & Kiefer, Markus
AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
http://www.ac-psych.org 2009 • volume 5 • 56-68 56
Specifying attentional top-down 
influences on subsequent 
unconscious semantic processing 
Ulla Martens1,2 and Markus Kiefer2
1 department of general Psychology i, University of osnabrück, germany
2 department of Psychiatry, University of Ulm, germany
automatic processes, 
unconscious cognition, 
attentional control, 
semantic priming, 
subliminal perception 
classical theories assume that unconscious automatic processes are autonomous and independ-
ent of higher-level cognitive influences. in contrast, we propose that automatic processing de-
pends on a specific configuration of the cognitive system by top-down control. in 2 experiments, 
we tested the influence of available attentional resources and previously activated task sets on 
masked semantic priming in a lexical decision task. in experiment 1, before masked prime pres-
entation, participants were engaged in an easy or hard primary task that differentially afforded 
attentional resources. semantic priming was attenuated when the primary task was hard, that is, 
when only little attentional resources were available. in experiment 2, a semantic or perceptual in-
duction task differentially modulated subsequent masked semantic priming. hence, unconscious 
automatic processing depends on the availability of attentional resources and is susceptible to 
top-down control.
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IntroductIon
For some time, it has been widely accepted that automatic processes 
are autonomous and immune to the influence of higher-level cogni-
tive functions. Specifically, classical theories of automaticity defined 
automatic processes as unconscious and independent from capacity-
limited resources. Furthermore, automatic processes act in parallel and 
are not prone to interference with other processes (Posner & Snyder, 
1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In contrast, controlled processes 
are, according to these theories, characterized as conscious and are 
influenced by top-down factors such as attention, task sets and action 
goals. Consequently, cognitive control can only operate on conscious 
cognition, while, coincidentally, unconscious automatic processes act 
unconstrained. This unimpeded occurrence of unconscious processes 
could cause increased demand for cognitive control and reconfigura-
tion, if the results of automatic processes interfere with the current 
conscious action plan. 
  Such an inflexible system, as assumed by classical theories, ap-
peared implausible given research findings about the flexibility and 
adaptability of the human brain and cognition: Recent studies suggest 
that top-down factors like attention and intention modulate automatic 
processes in a context-dependent manner. Therefore, refined concep-
tualizations of automaticity were proposed (Kiefer, 2007; Naccache, 
Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Neumann, 1984). According to these theo-
ries, automatic processes are assumed to be contingent on the configu-
ration of the cognitive system. The term conditional automaticity was 
therefore formed (Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989).
  To investigate automatic processes in isolation, the masked prim-
ing paradigm has proven to be an ideal tool. Here, the facilitating effect 
of an unconsciously presented masked stimulus on the processing of 
a subsequent visible target is measured. Processing of such a masked 
stimulus is thought to occur automatically without contribution of 
strategic influences. Consciously perceived stimuli also trigger auto-
matic  processes  (Hommel,  2000),  however,  most  likely,  controlled 
processes also contribute (Jacoby, 1991; Koivisto, 1998).
  Depending on the relationship between prime and target, dif-
ferent forms of priming can be distinguished. Response priming oc-
curs in two alternative-forced choice RT (reaction time) experiments 
when prime and target indicate the same motor response. This effect AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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is caused by automatic response preparation processes elicited by the 
unconsciously perceived prime, which facilitate same-hand responses 
towards the target (Dehaene et al., 1998; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; 
Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Verleger, Jaśkowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, 
& Groen, 2004; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 
2003). 
  Semantic priming refers instead to the facilitated classification of 
a target word when a preceding prime word is semantically related to 
the target (Neely, 1991). In contrast to the response priming paradigm, 
here, prime and target across different relatedness conditions require 
the same response. Even masked primes elicit semantic priming ef-
fects, which have been taken as evidence that the semantic meaning 
of the prime is unconsciously accessed and automatically pre-activates 
the semantic target representation (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 
2002).
  Researchers who have investigated automatic processes by using 
masked priming paradigms have challenged the classical assumptions 
by showing that top-down factors influenced masked priming effects 
and  formulated  refined  concepts  of  automaticity.  Neumann  (1984) 
developed the theory of direct parameter specification (DPS) to ex-
plain unconscious response priming. According to the theory, masked 
primes are only processed and do influence the response to a target if 
they match current intentions. More generally speaking, unconscious-
ly registered information is used to specify an open parameter of the 
currently active action plan, thereby triggering a prepared response. 
Converging evidence for this assumption comes from several studies, 
which showed that unconscious response priming only occurred when 
primes were task-relevant and congruent with currently active action-
goals (Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 
2005, Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003). 
  Recent studies have shown, additionally, that DPS theory can 
explain not only unconscious response priming but also subliminal 
priming of cognitive operations (Mattler, 2003) and subliminal prim-
ing of attention (Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, in press; Scharlau & Ansorge, 
2003).  However,  DPS  theory  has  no  neuro-functional  grounding, 
while the gating framework for unconscious cognition, stated by our 
research group, accounts for broader variety of cognitive processing 
and has a neurobiologically plausible basis (Kiefer, 2007). Specifically, 
we propose that, in unconscious cognition, the parameter specification, 
or generally speaking, the configuration of the cognitive system, by at-
tention, intention, and task sets, is achieved by a similar kind of gating 
mechanism  as  suggested  for  conscious  perception  (Hamker,  2005; 
Kiefer, 2007; Müller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003). Relevant task 
information is held in dorsolateral prefrontal areas of the brain, while 
the corresponding information-processing areas are located in poste-
rior regions of the brain. However, both are linked through neural con-
nections. The gating mechanism enhances processing of task-relevant 
stimulus information while attenuating task-irrelevant information. In 
neural networks, this mechanism is modelled by increasing the “gain” 
of neurons in brain areas that process task-relevant stimulus informa-
tion while decreasing the gain of neurons in other areas (e.g., Cohen & 
Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Hamker, 2005). The gain is a parameter that 
increases (high gain) or decreases (low gain) the likelihood that a neu-
ron, at a given activation level, fires. For example, by regulating the gain 
of sensory neurons, prefrontal areas could enhance sensory processing 
of task-relevant stimulus features and attenuate the processing of task-
irrelevant information. Accordingly, in a masked priming paradigm, 
unconsciously perceived stimuli can only trigger specific automatic 
processes (e.g., semantic priming) if the current task representation in 
prefrontal cortex enhances the corresponding information processing 
pathway in posterior (semantic) brain areas. However, if the gating 
mechanism  emphasizes  other  processing  pathways,  unconsciously 
perceived stimuli will not be able to elicit further “automatic” proc-
esses. 
  This postulated top-down gating mechanism accounts for un-
conscious and conscious cognition. However, top-down control for 
unconscious processing is only pre-emptive, while for conscious proc-
esses, reactive control can be administered additionally. In pre-emptive 
control, top-down influences are set up in advance of unconscious 
and conscious stimulus presentation, whereas reactive control refers 
to higher cognitive influences that are set up in response to ongoing 
or completed conscious stimulus processing. Hence, top-down con-
trol of unconscious cognition must occur implicitly on the grounds 
of currently activated action goals or outcomes of overt behaviour. 
Consequently,  the  possibility  of  intended  and  reactive  top-down 
modulation remains to be the most prominent distinguishing feature 
between controlled and automatic processes. In addition, subliminal 
information cannot be used for determining further strategic process-
ing steps in a deliberate fashion (Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). 
For that reason, conscious “strategic” stimulus processing allows for 
a greater adaptability and flexibility of top-down control than uncon-
scious “automatic” processing although both forms of processes share 
basic principles of top-down modulation.
  These  refined  assumptions  about  the  functional  mechanisms 
of unconscious perception and its susceptibility to top-down control 
receive support from several studies, which have demonstrated top-
down influences on unconscious response and semantic priming. In 
the context of DPS theory, we have already discussed the necessity of 
congruence between currently active intentions and masked primes 
to obtain facilitating response effects (Ansorge et al., 2002; Eckstein & 
Perrig, 2007; Kunde et al., 2003). In addition to intentions, the depend-
ence of unconscious processes on temporal attention has been dem-
onstrated (Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002). Kiefer and 
Brendel (2006), for example, presented an attentional cue in the time 
window of masked prime presentation in a semantic priming para-
digm or already one second earlier. This experimental manipulation 
prompted the participants’ temporal attention to the masked prime 
in the short cue prime interval (CPI), but they disengaged temporal 
attention from the unconsciously presented prime in the long CPI 
condition. Electrophysiological masked semantic priming effects were 
only present when the prime appeared in the attended time window. 
In a similar response priming study (Naccache et al., 2002), masked 
priming effects were only obtained when the onset of the prime-target 
pair was temporally predictable and, therefore, attended to. These re-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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sults suggest that temporal attention is a prerequisite for unconscious 
priming.  Top-down  control  processes  can  suppress  the  impact  of 
misguiding masked primes: Masked response priming effects were 
considerably reduced when the unconsciously presented prime was 
incompatible with the target in 80% of the trials, producing erroneous 
reactions (Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003; Wolbers et al., 2006). 
Although being not aware of the masked prime, participants perceived 
consciously the errors they made. Thus, top-down control was reac-
tively engaged in response to the errors and suppressed interfering 
subliminal information.
  In the following study, we present two behavioural experiments, 
in  which  we  tested  the  influence  of  available  attentional  resources 
(Experiment 1) and previously activated task sets (Experiment 2) on 
masked semantic priming in a lexical decision task. In Experiment 1, 
before masked prime presentation, participants were engaged in an easy 
or hard primary task that differentially afforded attentional resources. 
In Experiment 2, a semantic or perceptual task set was induced prior to 
unconscious semantic priming. We expected that both the availability 
of attentional resources, as well as the currently active task set, would 
influence subsequent unconscious prime processing.
ExpErImEnt 1
Following the study of Kiefer and Brendel (2006), in which semantic 
priming was modulated by an attentional cue, we assume that uncon-
scious  automatic  processes  depend  on  capacity-limited  attentional 
resources. Specifically, the gating framework (Kiefer, 2007) predicts 
that further semantic processing of subliminal stimuli requires an at-
tentional amplification of the unconscious stimulus representation. In 
order to test this assumption, we used two primary tasks that differed 
significantly in difficulty and had to be performed prior to a semantic 
masked priming procedure. As the primary tasks differentially drew 
on processing capacity, available attentional resources should be dif-
ferentially reduced for a period of several hundred milliseconds fol-
lowing task completion (for a review, see Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 
2001). In the easy primary task, participants had to decide whether or 
not a presented word contained a capital letter (at any position). When 
having given the response – 200, 500, 800, or 1100 ms – response-
prime-interval (RPI), later a masked prime word, was presented and, 
subsequently, a target word that afforded a lexical decision: Participants 
had to decide whether or not the target formed a real word. In the cases 
in which the masked prime word and the target word were semanti-
cally related, we assumed faster lexical decisions towards the target 
compared  with  unrelated  prime-target  pairings  (semantic  priming 
effect). In the other half of the trials, participants were engaged in a 
hard primary task prior to the lexical decision task. Participants had 
to decide whether the presented word contained a letter at the first or 
last position with a closed or open shape. If attentional processing ca-
pacity is a prerequisite for automatic processing to occur, then masked 
semantic  priming  should  be  larger  following  the  easy,  rather  than 
the hard, primary task.
Methods
ParticiPants
Thirty-two healthy, right-handed, native German speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision contributed data to this experi-
ment. The data of one participant had to be excluded from analysis, be-
cause the identification rate of this participant exceeded the confidence 
interval of chance performance in the masked prime identification test 
(more than 65% correct responses). The remaining 31 participants 
(17 men and 14 women) were in the age range of 17 to 32 years, with a 
mean of 24 years. Handedness was assessed using a translated version of 
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants 
signed a written consent form after the nature and the consequences of 
the experiment had been explained. The experiment was conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Material 
For the easy primary task, we presented 160 German words, half of 
which contained a capital letter at a random position within the word. 
The other half were written with small letters only. Word length of all 
words used in the primary tasks ranged from four to seven letters. 
Participants had to decide as quickly as possible whether or not the 
displayed word contained a capital letter. Half of the words started or 
finished with a letter containing at least one closed shape (e.g., A, B, e, 
g) and the other half started and finished with a letter that contained 
only open shapes (e.g., E, F, s, u), which served as stimuli in the hard 
primary task. Here, participants had to decide whether the first or last 
letter of the presented word contained an open or at least one closed 
shape. Responses were given by pressing one of the assigned keys 
with the index or middle finger of the right hand. In a pilot study with 
8 participants, reaction times of the performance of these two tasks 
were assessed. Task order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Reaction times were, indeed, significantly faster when performing the 
capital letter search than when making the closed vs. open shape deci-
sion (mean RT: 506 vs. 626 ms, p < .0001). Error rates were 4.9% for 
both tasks.
  The  set  of  primes  and  targets  for  the  lexical  decision  task 
consisted  of  320  German  word–word  and  320  word–pseudoword 
pairs, which has been used in earlier priming studies (Kiefer, 2002; 
Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). Primes and targets were, on average, five let-
ters long (range three–nine) and subtended at a viewing distance of 
90 cm and a visual angle of about 2.6° in width and 0.9° in height. The 
word–pseudoword pairs served as distracters and were not analysed 
further. The word–word combinations consisted of 160 semantically 
related pairs (e.g., ‘‘hen–egg’’) and 160 semantically unrelated pairs 
(e.g., ‘‘car–leaf’’). Critical prime–target combinations were equated in 
word length and frequency  of the primes (Ruoff, 1990), as well as those 
of the targets across conditions (pseudowords were only matched in 
length). Prime-target combinations were divided into eight lists. The 
assignment of each list to a given experimental condition (combina-
tion of primary task and RPI) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Each participant received different combinations of primary word and 
prime-target pairings.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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Procedure
The total number of 640 trials was divided into eight blocks of 
80 trials each. Breaks were provided between the blocks. Figure 1 dis-
plays the sequence of events used in the experimental paradigm. In 
each trial, participants were first presented with a fixation cross for 
750 ms, which was followed by a word for 500 ms that represented the 
stimulus for the primary tasks. Participants had to decide (a) in the 
easy primary task, whether or not the word contained a capital letter, 
and (b) in the hard primary task, whether the first or last letter of the 
word contained an open or a closed shape. As soon as the response 
was given, a random letter string (forward mask) consisting of 10 
capital letters was presented for 200, 500, 800, or 1100 ms (RPI). In 
either case, the random letter string was followed by the prime word, 
which was shown for 33 ms. After prime presentation, another ran-
dom letter string was presented for 33 ms, which served as a backward 
mask. Thereafter, the target stimulus that either formed a real word or 
a pronounceable pseudoword was displayed. Participants had to decide 
as fast and as accurately as possible whether or not the target was a real 
word. Responses were indicated by pressing one of two buttons with 
the right index and middle finger. Participants were not informed of 
the presence of the prime. The target remained on the screen until a re-
sponse was given. Thereafter, three hash marks were presented, which 
prompted the participant to initiate the next trial by pressing a button. 
All stimuli were displayed in white font against a black background 
on a computer monitor synchronous with the screen refresh (refresh 
rate  =  16.67  ms).  Trial  order  within  each  block  was  randomized, 
whereas the different primary tasks were presented in blocks. After 
the priming experiment, participants were informed of the presence 
of the prime behind the mask and were questioned as to whether they 
had recognized that prime words had been presented. None of the 
participants reported awareness of the primes. An objective measure 
of prime identification was obtained thereafter within a paradigm, 
which included the same sequence of events as the masked priming 
paradigm  (for  details,  see  Kiefer,  2002). In a visual discrimination 
task, masked stimuli consisted of 80 words and 80 letter strings. Each 
letter string comprised nine repetitions of the identical capital letter 
(e.g., “AAAAAAAAA”), which was randomly selected in each trial. 
Masked words were either semantically related or unrelated to a sub-
sequently presented unmasked context word (40 trials of each condi-
tion). This context word, for which no response was required, was in-
cluded in order to keep the sequence of events identical to the priming 
paradigm and to test whether backward priming from the target to the 
masked prime had occurred. Stimulation parameters were identical 
to the main experiment. The only difference was that only the RPI 
condition with 1100 ms was realized. This condition should provide a 
liberal estimation of masked prime identification for the shorter RPIs, 
because at the longest RPI, the masking influence of the primary task 
word is reduced. Participants were instructed to perform the easy or 
hard primary task on the first visible word. Thereafter, their task was 
to decide whether the masked stimulus was a word or a letter string. 
Primary word
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Fixation
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Figure 1.
sequence of events in the experimental paradigm used in experiment 1, consisting of an easy or hard primary task and subsequent 
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Instructions stressed accuracy over response speed. Participants were 
also requested to make their best guess when they did not feel confi-
dent about the correct response. 
Results
Masked word identification test
We assessed the visibility of the masked primes in an identification 
test following the priming phase. As noted above, data of one partici-
pant had to be excluded from further analysis because identification 
rate of this participant exceeded the confidence interval of chance 
performance. For the remaining 31 participants, identification per-
formance was distributed around the chance level of 50% (mean easy 
= 48.8%, mean hard = 52.4%), which is expected by mere guessing. In 
order to assess whether the targets facilitated identification of related 
masked primes (backward priming), d’ sensitivity measures for the se-
mantically related and unrelated conditions were calculated from each 
participant’s hit rates (correct responses to words) and false alarm rates 
(erroneous responses to letter strings) according to Green and Swets 
(1966). The measure d’ reflects whether the hit/false alarm rate distri-
butions of related prime-target pairs and unrelated prime-target pairs 
are identical (d’ = 0) or have no overlaps. A repeated-measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) on d’ measures with the within-subject factors 
semantic relatedness and task difficulty revealed a main effect for task 
difficulty, F(1, 30) = 8.7, p = .01, reflecting a somewhat lager visibility 
of the masked prime, when the hard primary task was performed be-
fore masked prime presentation, d’ = 0.14 (hard) vs. d’= -0.08 (easy). 
However,  no  interaction  with  semantic  relatedness  was  observed, 
F(1, 30) = 0.1, p = .80, which excludes that backward priming rendered 
the masked prime words partially recognizable. An additional t-test 
was performed to test whether d’ differed significantly from zero (i.e., 
chance performance). For the easy primary task, d’ did not differ from 
chance performance, t(30) = -1.3, p = .21, whereas for the hard primary 
task, d’ was significantly larger than zero, t(30) = 2.5, p = .018. That said, 
the value of d’ = 0.14 is very small, suggesting that participants were 
extracting no or only little information from the masked prime. 
PriMary task to ManiPulate availability of         
attentional resources
Of all response times to the primary tasks, the slowest 15% of tri-
als1 of each subject were rejected as outliers. Separate ANOVAs with 
repeated-measures were calculated on median reaction time (RT) and 
error rate (ER) that included the factor primary task (easy vs. hard). 
Responses were significantly faster in the easy than in the hard primary 
task, 662 vs. 835 ms, F(1, 30) = 73.2, p < .0001. An identical analysis of 
the error rate revealed a similar pattern. Performance was significantly 
less error prone in the easy than in the hard primary task, 1.9% vs. 
3.8%, F(1, 30) = 26.9, p < .0001. 
Figure 2.
Median and standard error of reaction times (Rt, upper panel) and error rates (eR, lower panel) in the lexical decision task towards 
semantically related (related - black) and unrelated (unrelated - white) prime-target pairings under easy and hard primary task condi-
tions, respectively, and separately for each response-prime-interval (RPi = 200, 500, 800, and 1100 ms).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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Masked PriMing
Of all response times to the lexical decision task, the slowest 15% 
of trials of each subject were defined as outliers. This resulted in the 
removal of 6.8% of trials from the relevant dataset (word-word pair-
ings). ANOVAs with repeated-measures on the factors primary task 
difficulty, and RPI and semantic relatedness were performed on me-
dian RT and ER. For the RT data all three main effects were significant. 
Lexical decisions were much faster when the previous primary task was 
easy rather than hard, F(1, 30) = 32.8, p < .0001; 681 vs. 748 ms. The 
RPI influenced response times towards the target significantly in the 
way that with increasing RPI response time decreased, F(3, 90) = 7.7, 
p < .001; 734 vs. 713 vs. 706 vs. 705 ms. Importantly, the semantically 
related prime-target pairs facilitated significantly the lexical decision 
towards  the  target  compared  with  semantically  unrelated  pairings, 
F(1, 30) = 19.2, p < .0001; 701 vs. 728 ms. This effect was further quali-
fied by the two-way interaction of primary task difficulty by semantic 
relatedness, F(1, 30) = 8.7, p = .0062. Following the easy primary task, 
masked priming effects were much larger, F(1, 30) = 39.0, p < .0001, 
Δm = 40.2 ms, compared with priming effects following the hard pri-
mary task, Δm = 13.5 ms (see Figure 2). In fact, masked priming in the 
hard primary task condition was not significant, F(1, 30) = 2.5, p = .13. 
Figure 2 illustrated the reaction time data and error rates separately for 
both primary task and the different RPIs.
As the d’ prime identification measure was significantly larger than 
zero following the hard primary task, we calculated for this primary 
task condition the correlation between the individual d’ and priming 
effect. This analysis was performed in order to determine a possible 
relationship between prime identification performance and masked 
priming effects. We only assessed priming effects at the 1100 ms RPI, 
because this RPI was used in the prime identification test, from which 
d’ measures were derived. As one can see in Figure 3, there was no 
correlation between masked prime recognizability and the priming ef-
fect (r = .14, p > .47), ruling out a contribution of conscious stimulus 
identification to masked priming.
When performing an identical ANOVA on ER, a main effect for se-
mantic relatedness was obtained, F(1, 30) = 10.7, p = .0027. Participants 
committed significantly fewer errors when the target was preceded by 
a semantically related prime than when the prime had no semantic 
relation to the target( 3.2% and 4.4%, respectively). This effect was fur-
ther qualified by the two-way interaction RPI by semantic relatedness, 
F(3, 90) = 2.7, p = .05. Planned contrast revealed significant priming 
effects in the 500 and 1100 ms RPI, but not in the other two RPIs, 
Fs > 7.2, ps < .012 vs. Fs < 1.8, ps > .19, respectively (see Figure 2). 
Primary task difficulty showed no effect at all on the error rates, that is, 
the three-way interaction was not significant, F (3, 90) = 1.9, p = .16.
Discussion
The  major  aim  of  this  experiment  was  to  investigate  whether  the 
availability  of  attentional  processing  capacity  affects  unconscious 
information  processing.  Specifically,  we  analysed  the  dependency 
of masked semantic priming effects on the cognitive demands of a 
previously performed task. First of all, as predicted, masked semantic 
priming was significantly reduced following a hard primary task in 
comparison with an easy one. Hence, subliminal processing, crucially, 
depends on the availability of attentional resources: A reduction of at-
tentional resources in the time window of masked prime presentation 
attenuates priming effects. The present results are clearly incompatible 
with classical theories of automaticity assuming independence of au-
tomatic processes from capacity-limited attention (Posner & Snyder, 
1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). The present experiment, therefore, 
confirms and extends earlier studies on the attentional modulation 
of unconscious processing. Our results are in line with earlier dem-
onstrations of the influence of temporal attention on masked priming 
(Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002). In extending this line 
of research, we showed for the first time that unconscious processing 
depends on the availability of attentional capacity.
A closer look at the magnitude of priming effects as a function of 
RPI is suggestive of a differential priming pattern following the easy and 
hard primary tasks. Following the easy primary task, semantic priming 
effects were significant for all RPI conditions and also exhibited a quite 
comparable magnitude, Fs > 9.4, ps < .0045, Δm >36.5 ms. Intriguingly, 
following the hard primary task, semantic priming was entirely blocked 
in the shorter RPIs (Fs < 1, Δm < 12.8 ms) but recovered when there was 
sufficient time (1100 ms) between the completion of the primary task 
and masked prime presentation, F(1, 30) = 3.9, p = .057, Δm = 35 ms. 
This pattern of masked priming effects on the different primary task 
conditions signals that, as outlined above, attentional capacity plays an 
important role in the processing of unconsciously presented stimuli. 
Figure 3.
correlation  between  the  individual  d’  value  for  masked  prime 
recognition following the hard primary task (x axis) and the cor-
responding priming effect (in milliseconds) of the lexical decision 
task following the hard primary task and a 1100 ms RPi (y axis: me-
dian Rt to semantically unrelated prime-target pairings minus Rt 
to related prime target pairings).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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However, this differential priming pattern could, additionally, reflect 
the influences of different task sets on masked priming. The primary 
tasks did not only differ with regard to their difficulty, but also with 
regard to how the word stimulus had to be processed. For the hard task, 
only the first and the last letters of the word were task relevant, whereas 
the easy task required scanning the whole word to search for a capital 
letter that could be at any position within the presented word. Thus, the 
primary tasks could have induced two different task sets, which had 
been implicitly applied to the masked prime: In the hard task, it was 
required to attend to perceptual letter features and to ignore the entire 
word form. This perceptual task set could have still been active in the 
first hundred milliseconds after task completion, thereby attenuating 
semantic processing of the prime word at the shorter RPIs. In contrast, 
for the easy primary task, the word stimuli had to be attended to as a 
whole because the capital letter appeared at a random location within 
the word. Accordingly, the easy primary task could have induced a task 
set that includes attention to the entire word and implicit word reading 
(Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005;  Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 
1990). As a result, if this task set had been implicitly applied to the 
masked prime, the subliminally presented word was semantically proc-
essed at any RPI. Hence, the pattern of priming effects could reflect the 
modulatory effects of task sets on unconscious semantic priming, in 
addition to the clear top-down influences of attentional capacity. To 
investigate possible task set effects on subsequent masked semantic 
priming, we designed a new experiment that used primary tasks of a 
comparable level of difficulty, which were expected to induce different 
forms of task sets. Consequently, we will refer to these primary tasks in 
Experiment 2 as induction tasks.
ExpErImEnt 2
In this second experiment, we explored the modulatory effects of task 
sets on masked semantic priming. Task sets are defined as adaptive 
configurations of the cognitive system for efficient performance in a 
given task (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This 
task-dependent configuration persists for a while, even after task com-
pletion, an effect that is known as task set inertia (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994). Hence, according to the gating framework of top-down 
control of unconscious cognition, task sets should be able to influence 
subsequent subliminal priming. To investigate the influences of task 
sets on masked priming, participants were engaged into a semantic 
or perceptual induction task that should activate either a semantic or 
a perceptual task set. After having given the response to the stimulus 
of the induction task, they underwent a masked semantic priming 
procedure. According to the gating framework, this activated task set 
should modulate masked priming effects. In detail, the induction task 
required either a semantic word categorization (living vs. non-living 
object), or a perceptual word categorization, the same as the hard pri-
mary task in Experiment 1, that is, first or last letter with closed or open 
shape. Subsequently, a masked prime word was displayed and followed 
by a lexical decision to the target. Combining knowledge about task-
switching and task configuration processes with our proposed gating 
framework, we infer a specific temporal dependency of modulatory 
effects of task sets on masked semantic priming. The time course of 
the reconfiguration process in task-switch conditions was accessed by 
Rogers and Monsell (1995). Specifically, they investigated the influence 
of five response-stimulus intervals on shift costs using the alternating 
runs paradigm, in which the task switch was predictable. Their results 
indicated that the reconfiguration process for a change of task lasts for 
approximately 600 ms. Furthermore, there is evidence of active inhi-
bition of task sets when the task has been completed (Mayr & Keele, 
2000). Thus, the time interval between response to the induction task 
and presentation of the subliminal prime (RPI) could be of importance 
for modulatory task-set influences on semantic priming effects.
In  order  to  assess  these  temporal  dynamics  of  top-down 
modulation in detail, we systematically manipulated the RPI as in 
Experiment 1. With 200, 500, 800, and 1100 ms, we chose equidis-
tant RPIs in order to see whether the modulatory task set effects on 
semantic priming were gradual or more of an all-or-nothing pattern. 
When performing the semantic induction task, a corresponding task 
set will be activated and semantic processing pathways will be em-
phasized for around 600 ms. As a consequence, semantic processing 
of the subsequently presented masked prime will be facilitated within 
this  time  window.  Hence,  we  expect  to  observe  a  robust  priming 
effect to targets in the lexical task when the masked prime is pre-
sented shortly after the response to the induction task (RPI = 200 and 
500  ms).  However,  when  performing  a  perceptual  induction  task, 
the configuration of the cognitive system will emphasize perceptual 
processing of the subsequently presented masked prime. No, or only 
minimal, semantic information can be retrieved from the prime at a 
short RPI, which attenuates semantic priming in the following lexical 
decision task. However, according to the study by Rogers and Monsell 
(1995), the task set evoked by the induction task should have decayed 
or been actively suppressed (Mayr & Keele, 2000) when the masked 
prime is presented at a time point later than 600 ms after the response 
to the induction task. Consequently, if the RPI between the percep-
tual induction task and the following masked semantic prime is large 
enough (800 and 1100 ms), the emphasis on perceptual processing 
diminishes. This should allow for semantic processing of the masked 
prime  and  result  in  a  semantic  priming  effect.  The  opposite  effect 
should be observed for a long RPI after the semantic induction task: 
At this long RPI, the semantic task set should be suppressed (Mayr & 
Keele, 2000) so that semantic processing of the masked prime would be 
abolished. As a consequence, we expect a reduction of semantic prim-
ing for a semantic induction task after a long RPI. 
Methods
ParticiPants
Forty-one, right-handed (Oldfield, 1971), native German speakers 
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision contributed data to this 
experiment. In total, 10 participants had to be excluded, 6 because 
the identification rate of these participants exceeded the confidence AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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interval of chance performance in the masked prime identification test 
and 4 due to high error rates and/or too many outliers. The remaining 
31 participants (18 men, 13 women) were in the age range of 20 to 44 
years, with a mean of 24.6 years. All participants signed a written con-
sent form after the nature and the consequences of the experiment had 
been explained. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Material and Procedure
The stimulus sets for primes and targets, the timing of all events as 
well as their analysis were identical to Experiment 1. The only differ-
ence pertained to the primary tasks. While in Experiment 1 primary 
task difficulty was manipulated, this experiment aimed to investigate 
the differential effect of a perceptual and a semantic task set. In order 
to do so, we chose the hard primary task (closed vs. open-letter shape) 
from Experiment 1 as a task to induce a perceptual task set (perceptual 
induction task) and created a second induction task that should acti-
vate a semantic task set. We used 160 German words, therefore, half 
of which described living objects (e.g., “pilot”, “apple”, “dog”) and the 
other half referred to non-living objects (e.g., “castle”, “pencil”, “bottle”), 
as word stimuli for the semantic task. Word length of all stimuli of the 
induction tasks ranged from five to six letters and they were equated 
for word frequency. This stimulus set was tested in a pilot experiment. 
Fifteen participants (9 men and 6 women) with an average of 22.4 
years performed the induction tasks in separate blocks. Task order was 
counterbalanced across participants. The perceptual task required par-
ticipants to decide whether the first or last letter of the presented word 
contained an open or a closed shape. In the semantic task, participants 
decided whether the presented word described a living or a nonliving 
object. Responses were given by pressing one of the assigned keys with 
the index or middle finger of the right hand. Median response times 
of correct answers and error rates did not show a significant difference 
between the perceptual and the semantic task, 720 vs. 754 ms, p = .23, 
and 3.6% vs. 6.9%, p = .13 respectively. 
Besides the different induction tasks, all the other experimental 
parameters, including the recognition test, were identical with those in 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 1).
Results
Masked word identification test
We assessed the visibility of the masked primes in an identification 
test following the priming phase. As noted above, data of 6 participants 
had to be excluded from further analysis because identification rate of 
these participants exceeded the confidence interval of chance perform-
ance or because they reported having recognized the masked prime. 
For  the  remaining  31  participants,  identification  performance  was 
distributed around the chance level of 50% (mean perceptual = 48.7% 
and semantic = 49.1%), which is expected by mere guessing. Repeated-
measures  ANOVA  on  d’  measures  (for  details,  see  Experiment  1) 
with the within-subject factors semantic relatedness and induction 
task revealed no significant differences between conditions, Fs < 2.4, 
ps > .128, which excludes that backward priming rendered the masked 
prime words partially recognizable. Additional t-tests of d’ against zero 
show no significant difference from chance performance, neither after 
the semantic induction task; d’ = - 0.13, t(30) = -1.8, p = .081;  nor after 
the perceptual induction task, d’ = - 0.03, t(30) = -.4, p = .68.
induction task to activate task sets
Of all response times to the induction tasks, the slowest 15% of trials 
of each subject were defined as outliers. Repeated-measures ANOVAs 
on median reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) with the within-
subject factor induction task was performed. Semantic decisions were 
made significantly faster than perceptual decisions, 772 vs. 820 ms, 
F(1, 30) = 12.6, p = .002. An identical analysis of the error rates revealed 
a reverse pattern. Participants produced significantly more errors in 
the semantic induction task than in the perceptual one, 11% vs. 5.5%, 
F(1, 30) = 28.4, p < .0001. 
Masked PriMing
Of all response times to the lexical decision task, the slowest 15% 
of trials of each subject were rejected as outliers. This resulted in the 
removal of 7.5% of trials from the relevant dataset (word-word pair-
ings). Repeated-measures ANOVAs on median RT and ER with the 
within-subject factors induction task, RPI, and semantic relatedness 
were performed. RT and ER results are displayed in Figure 4. All three 
main effects were significant. Lexical decisions were faster, when the 
previously  activated  task  set  was  perceptual  rather  than  semantic, 
F(1, 30) = 7.1, p = .013, 731 vs. 754 ms. The RPI influenced response 
times towards the target significantly in that with increasing RPI, re-
sponse time decreased, F(3, 90) = 10.6, p < .0001, 765 vs. 747 vs. 737 vs. 
721 ms. Most importantly, semantically related prime-target pairs fa-
cilitated significantly the lexical decision towards the target, compared 
with semantically unrelated pairings;  F(1, 30) = 15.8, p < .001, 732 vs. 
753 ms; an effect that was further qualified by the three-way interac-
tion of induction task by RPI by semantic relatedness, F(3, 90) = 2.8, 
p = .045. Planned contrasts, comparing response times with semanti-
cally related and unrelated prime-target pairs separately for each in-
duction task and RPI condition, revealed an opposite pattern of prim-
ing effects for a previously induced semantic and perceptual task set 
respectively, dependent on the RPI. Unexpectedly, for the 200 ms RPI, 
no priming effect was observed when a semantic task set was induced, 
F(1, 30) = 1.0, p = .32, Δm = 12.2 ms. But, when a perceptual task set 
was induced, lexical decisions towards target words were significantly 
facilitated by semantically related primes, an effect that was not ob-
served in the identical task and RPI in Experiment 1, F(1, 30) = 5.8, 
p = .023, Δm = 38.4 ms. This pattern was reversed for the 500 ms RPI. 
Here, an induced semantic task set yielded a significant masked prim-
ing effect;  F(1, 30) = 14.9, p < .001, Δm = 43.7 ms; whereas an induced 
perceptual task set prevented masked priming, F(1, 30) = 0.5, p = .47, 
Δm = -12.2 ms. A significant priming effect was not observed under 
any induction task condition for either the 800 or for the 1100 ms RPI. 
However, the quantitative pattern, as can be seen in Figure 4, indi-
cated increased priming for preceding perceptual task set induction; AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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Δm = 23.3 ms (800 ms RPI) vs. 27.1 ms (1100 ms RPI);  and decreased 
priming for preceding semantic task set induction, Δm = 28.1 ms 
(800 ms RPI) vs. 5.4 ms (1100 ms RPI).
An equivalent ANOVA performed on the error rates showed simi-
lar effects to the RT data. The main effects induction task and semantic 
relatedness were significant. Lexical decisions were more error prone 
when previously a semantic task set was induced than a perceptual 
one, F(1, 30) = 4.3, p = .046, 5.3% vs. 4.3%. Responses to targets that 
were preceded by a semantically related prime were more often correct 
than when preceded by a semantically unrelated word, 3.6% vs. 5.9%, 
F(1, 30) = 27.8, p < .0001. This effect was further qualified by the 
predicted three-way interaction induction task by RPI by semantic 
relatedness, F(3, 90) = 3.3, p = .0233. Planned contrast revealed a clear 
pattern of significant priming effects for the 200 and 500 ms RPI subse-
quent to a semantic induction task; F(1, 30) = 8.2, p = .0077 (Δ = 4.2%); 
and F(1, 30) = 11.8, p = .0018 (Δ = 3.9%), respectively. No priming 
effect, however, occurred for the 800 and 1100 ms RPIs; Fs(1, 30) < 2.7, 
ps > .11; subsequent to a semantic induction task (Δ = 2.3 and 1.6%). 
However, subsequent to a perceptual induction task, no priming effect 
was observed for the 200 and 500 ms RPIs; Fs(1, 30) < 3.3, ps > .078 
(Δ  =  1.8%  and  -1.3%);  but  for  the  800  and  the  1100  ms  RPIs; 
F(1, 30) = 7.4, p = .011 (Δ = 2.7%); and F(1, 30) = 5.8, p = .023 (Δ = 
3.2%), respectively.
Discussion
The present results demonstrated a differential modulation of masked 
semantic priming effects by the induced task set. In detail, we observed 
a three-way interaction between induction task, semantic relatedness, 
and RPI in both RT as well as ER. The priming pattern in the ER data 
was quite straightforward: Semantic priming occurred when a seman-
tic task set was active shortly before the presentation of the masked 
prime (RPIs of 200 and 500 ms). However, when a perceptual task set 
was induced, priming effects were abolished at these short RPIs. In the 
long RPI conditions instead (800 and 1100 ms), semantic priming was 
absent after the semantic induction task, but priming effects recovered 
after a perceptual one. While the RT priming effects at RPIs of 500 ms 
and greater also showed this pattern, they were deviant at the short-
est RPI of 200 ms. We would like to refer to a more recent study at 
this point, in which we used the identical tasks but the double amount 
of trials because only two RPIs were administered. In this study, we 
replicated for the perceptual induction task the identical pattern from 
Experiment 1 (no semantic priming at the 200 ms RPI) and found a 
reliable semantic priming effect subsequently to the semantic induc-
tion task in the 200 ms RPI (Kiefer & Martens, submitted). For that 
reason, we assume that the limited amount of trials, and the resulting 
lower signal-to-noise-ratio, is responsible for the unexpected RT prim-
ing effects at the shortest RPI in the present experiment.
The present masked priming results as a function of the RPIs are in 
accordance with the known time course of task configuration during 
task switching (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). It has been shown that a task 
set is active for about 600 ms. Thereafter, the task set is deactivated 
and the cognitive system is being reconfigured to meet the new task 
demands. In line with these findings in task switching, the semantic 
induction task opens semantic processing pathways for an interval 
of several hundred milliseconds (RPI of 200 and 500 ms) and allows 
Figure 4.
Median and standard error of reaction times (Rt, upper panel) and error rates (eR, lower panel) in the lexical decision task towards 
semantically related (related - black) and unrelated (unrelated - white) prime-target pairings under semantic and perceptual induction 
task conditions respectively and separately for each response-prime-interval (RPi = 200, 500, 800, and 1100 ms).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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for subsequent masked prime processing at a semantic level, resulting 
in semantic priming effects. However, at longer time intervals (RPIs 
of 800 and 1100 ms), the semantic task set is no longer active, and 
semantic processing of the masked prime is attenuated as result of a 
backward inhibition process, which refers to an inhibition of a task 
set once the task has been actively completed (Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
For that reason, when participants have sufficient time to abandon the 
semantic classification task, the semantic task set is deactivated. This 
deactivation of a semantic task set takes place even during the concur-
rent preparation of the lexical decision task, whose task set predomi-
nantly comprises lexical processing but only to some extent semantic 
processing. This interpretation could explain why lexical decisions are 
slower subsequent to the semantic induction task in comparison to the 
perceptual induction task, although within the main experiment the 
semantic induction task was slightly easier to perform and therefore 
less capacity-demanding. In the pilot study, in which performance of 
the induction tasks was assessed in isolation, both tasks exhibited a 
comparable level of difficulty.
The perceptual induction task, instead, emphasizes pathways that 
are involved in visual letter encoding and attenuates other processes for 
several hundred milliseconds. The meaning of the masked prime can-
not be analysed and no semantic priming can occur. At longer RPIs, 
however, the backward inhibition process deactivates the perceptual 
task set, and the cognitive system has time to reconfigure for the lexical 
decision task. Under this cognitive configuration, semantic processing 
pathways are opened, and an unconsciously presented prime triggers 
automatic semantic processes.
GEnEral dIscussIon
The present study investigated the effects of attentional capacity and 
currently active task sets on unconscious semantic priming. We used 
an experimental paradigm, in which participants were engaged in two 
primary tasks that differed in difficulty (Experiment 1) or in a semantic 
or perceptual induction task (Experiment 2). Subsequently, participants 
underwent masked semantic priming within a lexical decision task. In 
Experiment 1, the primary tasks served to manipulate the availability 
of attentional capacity prior to the presentation of the unconsciously 
perceived prime word. The effectiveness of this manipulation is dem-
onstrated  not  only  by  the  performance  difference  for  the  primary 
tasks themselves, but also by the carry-over effects to the subsequent 
lexical decision task (Pashler et al., 2001): The reduced availability of 
attentional resources following the hard primary task, compared with 
the easy primary task, is also reflected in the considerable slowing of 
lexical decisions. However, most critically to show that we were not just 
measuring unspecific slowing effects, the masked semantic priming ef-
fect was differentially modulated by task difficulty. We showed for the 
first time that attentional processing capacity is clearly a prerequisite 
for masked prime processing and the observation of unconscious se-
mantic priming effects. Masked primes led only to the facilitation of 
the processing of semantically related target words when the preceding 
primary task was easy and required less cognitive resources compared 
with the hard primary task. This finding clearly challenges classical 
theories of automaticity, since these assume that unconscious proc-
esses are autonomous and can act in parallel to, and independent from, 
other cognitive processes. However, refined theories of automaticity, as 
the gating framework (Kiefer, 2007), actually predict a dependence of 
unconscious processing on top-down amplification. 
In  addition  to  the  strong  effect  of  attentional  capacity, 
Experiment 1 was suggestive of the influence of task sets on masked 
semantic priming. As outlined in the discussion of Experiment 1, the 
task demands between the easy and hard primary task were different. 
While the easy task involved attention to the entire word, the hard task 
required only attention to single-letter features. To explore this pos-
sibility further, we conducted Experiment 2, which investigated the 
differential effect of task sets on subsequent masked semantic priming. 
We used semantic and perceptual induction tasks with a comparable 
level of task difficulty according to a pilot study, in order to induce cor-
responding task sets. In Experiment 2, within the context of the lexical 
decision task, the semantic induction task was slightly easier than the 
perceptual induction task, but still, the difference of difficulty was much 
smaller than in Experiment 1 (Experiment 1: 173 ms, Experiment 2: 
48 ms). We reasoned that the task set –  semantic or perceptual – ac-
tivated by the induction tasks, configures the cognitive system of the 
participant in a specific way for a limited period of time and enhances 
or attenuates semantic and perceptual processing pathways respec-
tively (Kiefer, 2007). As a consequence, when a masked semantic prime 
word was presented shortly after the induction task, the activated task 
set determined whether or not the unconsciously perceived word was 
processed at a semantic level and elicited priming effects. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that masked semantic priming was 
indeed differentially influenced by the different previously activated 
task sets. Previous studies, investigating unmasked (visible) semantic 
priming found modulatory effects of prime tasks, as reviewed in (for 
a review, see Maxfield, 1997). Here, semantic priming was reduced or 
absent when the task required attention to perceptual letter features 
of visible prime words, for example, a letter search task, and not their 
semantic analysis (Chiappe, Smith, & Besner, 1996; Mari-Beffa, Valdes, 
Cullen, Catena, & Houghton, 2005). It is notable that both automatic 
spreading of activation in the semantic network and controlled con-
scious strategic processes contribute to the processing of visible primes 
(Posner & Snyder, 1975). This makes a co-occurrence of automatic 
and  strategic  processes  most  likely  (Jacoby,  1991;  Koivisto,  1998). 
Consequently, one has to eliminate conscious prime identification, in 
order to study solely automatic processing without contamination of 
strategic processes. We ensured this by masking the prime and measur-
ing its recognizability individually.
Divergent results in the literature led to the debate as to whether 
or  not  semantic  processing  is  automatic.  Several  studies  (Carr  & 
Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000; Rolke, Heil, 
Streb,  &  Henninghausen,  2001)  have  demonstrated  reliably  the  fa-
cilitation of target processing by semantically related unconsciously 
perceived primes. As outlined earlier, these findings provide support 
for automatic semantic processing, since strategic processes cannot AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology ReseARch ARticle
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contribute  to  unconscious  prime  analysis.  In  contrast,  the  above-
mentioned prime task effects on conscious priming have been taken as 
support for the view that semantic processing depends on controlled 
memory retrieval in congruency with attentional task representations 
(e.g., semantic orientation towards the prime stimulus). Importantly, 
our demonstration that masked semantic priming can be top-down 
modulated  by  the  availability  of  attentional  capacity  and  task  sets, 
suggests that unconscious semantic processing, and the notion of at-
tentional top-down control, is not necessarily a contradiction, as pre-
viously thought. Semantic processing can occur automatically, in the 
sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention, but unconscious 
“automatic” semantic processing underlies attentional top-down am-
plification and control, and is only elicited if the cognitive system is 
configured accordingly. Such a configuration is induced in classical 
masked priming experiments without a preceding induction task by the 
preparation for the target task (e.g., a lexical decision or naming task). 
The attentional orientation towards word recognition, in contrast with 
perceptual letter identification, opens the pathway for unconscious 
semantic processing of the masked prime (see also Valdes, Catena, & 
Mari-Beffa, 2005). Earlier findings of prime task effects do not question, 
but strongly support, refined theories of automaticity, which stress the 
necessity for an appropriate top-down configuration of the cognitive 
system for automatic processes to occur (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; 
Kiefer, 2007; Neumann, 1984). In fact, refined theories of automaticity 
explicitly predict such an interaction between prime task and semantic 
priming. We therefore argue that the concept of automaticity, which 
was defined by independence of attentional top-down factors and by 
autonomy (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), should 
be replaced by the notion of conditional automaticity (Bargh, 1989). 
The results of our experiments are congruent with those of stud-
ies on prime task effects, which we discussed earlier, suggesting that 
conscious and unconscious semantic processes are governed by similar 
computational principles. This is, in line with the assumption of the 
gating framework (Kiefer, 2007), since we assume that explicit tasks 
on visible primes configure the cognitive system in the same way as 
implicit task sets. Although our results suggest that consciously con-
trolled and unconscious automatic processes underlie similar compu-
tational properties, there are certain limitations. One has to distinguish 
between the different forms of control that can operate in unconscious 
and conscious processes. Preemptive, top-down influences are set up in 
advance of stimulus presentation and can be exerted for both conscious 
and  unconscious  stimulus  presentations.  However,  reactive  control 
refers to strategic processes that are established in response to ongo-
ing or completed analysis of consciously perceived stimuli (Ansorge 
& Horstmann, 2007; Kiefer, 2007): Conscious processing, presumably, 
remains a prerequisite for more specific and flexible strategic control.
The  present  experiments  support  the  view  that  unconscious 
processing depends on attentional capacity and is susceptible to top-
down control. Yet, the finely grained mechanisms underlying these 
attentional effects on subliminal stimulus processing have to be deter-
mined. However, we argue that such an implicit top-down control of 
unconscious automatic processing optimizes the cognitive system for 
pursuing an intended goal by prioritizing task-congruent information 
and suppressing interfering influences. Consequently, this mechanism 
considerably reduces the risk that unintended and not goal-related 
unconscious processes determine cognition, and eventually influences 
behaviour. 
footnotes
1    This criterion was chosen due to the few trials (20 per condition) 
and high variance in the response times of the lexical decision and also 
applied to the primary tasks to use comparable analysis parameters. 
Analyses of the untrimmed data (using all trials) of both experiments 
showed identical effect patterns as reported for the trimmed data.
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